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ABSTRACT
The article discusses the history of local taxation in Germany and its current state, 
focusing on the correspondence of the existing local taxes to the criteria of optimal 
local taxation. The author’s hypothesis is that the German system of local taxation, 
which dates back to the imperial period, can and should be reformed in order to meet 
the internationally recognized criteria. The analysis is based on several criteria: the 
general criteria, which apply to all taxes, including federal; criteria for local and central 
taxes and, last but not least, criteria for relationships between local governments. The 
history of the three local taxes (property tax, business tax and income tax) is viewed 
in the light of the above-described criteria. It is shown that the local business tax 
needs to be adjusted according to the criteria of optimal local taxation. The author 
also explains why, from the theoretical perspective, it was important to transfer 
the revenue from the income tax to the local level in 1969 and points out that local 
governments currently lack the authority to set tax rates. The case of the property 
tax, introduced in 1936, is particularly interesting, taking into consideration the 
current plans to amend the existing legislation. The author compares the two possible 
scenarios of the future tax reforms and comes to the conclusion that only one of 
them fully meets the international standards. The analysis has shown that the local 
taxation system in Germany is quite efficient, although there is definitely some room 
for improvement. The combination of the business tax and the income tax allow local 
authorities to balance the interests of local households and businesses. 
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АННОТАЦИЯ
Не ограничиваясь простым описанием истории местного налогообложения 
в Германии, автор оценивает существующую систему и ее историческое раз-
витие на соответствие различным критериям оптимального местного налога. 
Гипотеза автора говорит о том, что немецкая система местного налогообло-
жения, сложившаяся с имперских времен, может быть реформирована, чтобы 
достаточно хорошо соответствовать общепринятым критериям. Для анализа 
выделено несколько критериев: критерии для любого налога (также федераль-
ного), критерии для местных и центральных налогов и, что не менее важно, 
критерии для отношений между местными органами власти. Основываясь на 
этих критериях, описывается история трех местных налогов (налог на имуще-
ство, местный налог на бизнес, местный налог на прибыль). Развитие налога 
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на имущество описано с момента его введения в 1936 г. вплоть до настоящего 
времени. С учетом наличия планов по внесению дальнейших изменений в за-
конодательство, оценены две возможные альтернативы его предстоящего ре-
формирования. Сделан вывод, что из двух предлагаемых вариантов его измене-
ния лишь один соответствует международным стандартам. На основе анализа 
системы реформ, последовательно изменявших местный промысловый налог, 
сделан вывод о необходимости его скорейшего реформирования в целях приве-
дения в соответствие с критериями оптимального местного налогообложения. 
Оправдана, с теоретических позиций, важность передачи на местный уровень 
власти в 1969 г. доли поступлений от налога на доходы. Вместе с тем отмечен 
недостаток полномочий местного уровня по установлению налоговой ставки. 
Анализ показал, что система местного налогообложения в Германии в целом не 
плоха, но может быть значительно улучшена. Промысловый налог и налог на 
доходы, работая совместно, создают предпосылки для балансирования интере-
сов коренного населения и предпринимательского сообщества, а в целом три 
названных источника доходов сформировали неплохую местную систему на-
логообложения Германии. Вместе с тем все элементы этой системы нуждаются 
в реформировании.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА
местный налог, критерии местного налога, местное налогообложение, история 
налогообложения, налог на имущество, промысловый налог, местный налог на 
доход
1. Introduction
An article on the history of local taxa-
tion in Germany can serve several pur-
poses. Whoever works on national tax 
systems, needs to compare the manner in 
which various countries have embedded 
their local taxation in the overall system. 
Experts specializing on specific local taxes 
may engage in cross-country comparisons 
and draw conclusions about the strengths 
and weaknesses of local taxes in different 
countries. 
The hypothesis that we are going to 
discuss in this article is that the German 
local tax system, which evolved in the im-
perial period, went through a brief demo-
cratic phase (1918–1933), then the Nazi 
period, and, finally, entered the peaceful 
democratic phase, needs to be adjusted 
and reformed in order to correspond to 
modern internationally recognized crite-
ria of effective taxation. 
An economist writing on the history 
of local taxation in Germany looks at the 
historical development and its results 
from an economic perspective. The cru-
cial question he or she needs to answer is 
whether this development moved in the 
right direction, which means that certain 
criteria of “optimal” taxation are required. 
Therefore, in this article, we start with the 
description of such criteria and an over-
view of the current system of local taxes in 
Germany. The following parts deal with 
the development of individual taxes after 
World War II, including the major fiscal 
reforms, and in conclusion we are going to 
describe the reforms necessary for further 
development of the system. 
2. Criteria of efficient local taxation and 
an overview of the current tax system
2.1. What is a good local tax? 
Not all taxes can be considered as suit-
able for use on the local level (for more in-
formation on the main criteria see our pre-
vious works [1; 2]), for instance, the VAT 
is not recommended to be introduced as 
a local tax. The “why”, however, is not so 
easy to pin down, because it contains a 
multitude of different aspects (see Fisher 
[3] for an alternative system of tax anal-
ysis principles). Boadway and Shah [4] 
concentrate on decentralizing taxes on the 
state level. Some economists, for example, 
Oates [5; 6] and Seiler [7], focus on local 
taxation. The overview of assessment cri-
teria for local taxes is given in Table 1 be-
low. These criteria can be divided into two 
groups: those that apply to any tax, local 
or federal, and those that apply only to lo-
cal taxation. 
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Obviously, local taxes should meet 
some general criteria that apply to all kinds 
of taxes, for instance, they should provide 
sufficient revenue net of administrative 
and taxpayer costs (1). The latter can be an 
issue when it comes to small local taxes.
All taxes should be collected to meet 
the allocational objective, which means 
that private as well as public production 
should serve the preferences of people 
and be produced at an optimal cost (2). 
For local taxes it means that they should 
be levied under the benefit principle in the 
sense that they are considered as a remu-
neration paid for local services by busi-
nesses and private households. Moreover, 
each of these taxes should carry as little 
excess burden as possible, which means 
that the income effect should be high and 
the substitution effect, low. Further we are 
going to discuss the property tax in more 
detail and consider the example of the so-
called window tax, which illustrates the 
negative effects of high excess burden. In 
general, excess burden is associated with 
a broad tax base, which means that the 
income tax is better than the consumption 
tax, the consumption tax is better than the 
beer tax, and so on. 
Local taxes should not interfere more 
than necessary with the national objec-
tives of dampening business cycles and 
supporting economic growth (3). If a lo-
cal tax brings a high revenue in the period 
of prosperity, this leads to more invest-
ment, which increases the “boom” effect. 
However, if a tax remains stable over the 
different stages of the business cycle and 
increases slowly together with the general 
growth, it provides resources for future 
development. 
Table 1
Assessment criteria for local taxes
Criteria applied to any 
tax within a “rational” tax 
system
Criteria applied on lower levels (local taxes)
Vertical justification framework Horizontal justification 
framework
(1) Fiscal yield and cost 
efficiency
(2) Allocational objectives
(3) Objectives of stabilization 
and growth
(4) Objectives of social justice
(5) Perceptibility
(6) Changeability
(7) Local economic source of the tax
(8) Balance of interests
(9) Low reaction to business cycles
(10) Proportionate reaction to growth
(11) Avoidance of 
unnecessary migration
(12) Inter-local distribution 
of the tax base according to 
local needs
Source: [1, Chapter 4]
Another important aspect to consider 
is, of course, matters of social justice (4), 
that is, taxes should take into account peo-
ple’s ability to pay. A good example in this 
respect is again provided by the property 
tax, which should follow the above-men-
tioned benefit principle. 
The criteria applied only to local taxes 
are even more important than general ones. 
These can be divided into two groups. The 
first group is defined by the vertical justi-
fication framework: what aspects constitute 
“good” local taxes as opposed to federal 
and state taxes? The dominant principle 
for organizing taxation on the local level 
is the principle of fiscal equivalence by 
Olson (see [1; 8] for more detail). Accord-
ing to this principle, each local govern-
ment should finance its functions in such a 
way that the advantages of the additional 
expenditure are weighed against the dis-
advantages of the additional tax payment. 
That is why the principles of perceptibil-
ity and changeability are necessary: per-
ceptibility means that a tax must be “felt” 
(and thus known) in order to be effective 
(5). The VAT is not “felt”, but a personal 
income tax is. To enable the local govern-
ment to act this way it is necessary that it 
can change the tax, especially the tax rate 
(6) (the principle of changeability). Even 
though all of this sounds self-evident, we 
have to admit that German local taxes are 
lacking in this respect. 
Another important aspect is that all 
local taxes should be generated from the 
locality’s own sources (7), which means 
that the revenue base is local. This is gen-
erally true for fees and charges, but not 
necessarily true for all local taxes, as it 
will be shown for the case of the so-called 
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German local VAT share. This principle is 
not so important for the taxpayer, but it 
is for the local politician, who should be 
interested in fostering these sources and 
thereby care for local economic growth 
and, therefore, for national growth.
The local tax system should have an 
approximately equal burden on business-
es and private households (the principle 
of balanced interests) (8). It is essential 
that politicians should pay attention to the 
interests of both parties rather than con-
centrate only one of them. Moreover, the 
tax revenue should not fluctuate together 
with the business cycle (9), because this 
makes budget planning difficult and in-
tensifies the business cycle. Instead, the 
local tax should develop in the way that 
is somehow proportionate to the growth 
(10), thus enabling the local budget to fi-
nance the growth-relevant infrastructure. 
If we look at local taxation within the 
vertical framework, we can compare local 
taxes with federal taxes. If we look at them 
within the horizontal framework, we can 
compare local taxes in different localities. 
Economic theory postulates that unneces-
sary migration is inefficient (see [1; 2]) and 
thus should be avoided (11). Therefore, lo-
cal taxes should not vary significantly be-
tween local governments. Finally, the tax 
base should be distributed between local 
governments according to the local fiscal 
needs (12), because otherwise this increas-
es the need for fiscal equalization.
Not all of these criteria can be fulfilled 
at the same time but when looking at indi-
vidual local taxes in Germany, we notice 
significant violations of certain require-
ments, this may indicate the need for re-
forms. Since there is no single “good local 
tax system”, there will always be a need 
for adjustments and reforms within the 
existing systems. 
2.2. Local taxes in the current system 
of German local revenue
For the evaluation of the history of lo-
cal taxes in Germany it is helpful to first 
have a look at the existing system, which 
results from the historical process. Table 2 
shows local taxes and fees and charges, 
which together form revenues from lo-
calities’ own sources. Their importance 
was indicated above: local governments 
are interested in “nursing” this part of 
local revenue for a number of reasons: a 
good infrastructure for businesses and 
private households satisfies the needs of 
local inhabitants and entrepreneurs and is 
also an asset when it comes to attracting 
people and businesses from other regions. 
A good administration finds out about the 
needs of the population by, for instance, 
meeting entrepreneurs and their associa-
tions on a regular basis.
The second type of revenues shown 
in Table 2 is the intergovernmental revenue. 
Grants are the funds provided by the state 
government, not “earned” by local effort, 
but attracted by lobbying elsewhere. It is 
essential when constructing the system 
of local revenues to keep the share of the 
intergovernmental revenue low. Central 
and state governments have numerous 
reasons for breaking this rule, but only a 
few of them seem reasonable while the 
majority are of a paternalistic nature.
If we go back to the revenue from the 
locality’s own sources, the second rule 
could be formulated as “fees and charges 
first”. This revenue is based on the benefit 
principle and has a much closer relation 
to the payer than the taxpayer has to their 
tax. When fees and charges are levied, this 
only occurs for the specific service which 
has been extended. Therefore, the payer 
can judge whether the payment is worth 
the benefit and can judge insofar the effi-
ciency of their local government.
Table 3 illustrates the dynamics of 
the share of the revenue from the local-
ity’s own sources in the period between 
1996 and 2016, that is, over the last twenty 
years. The total sum is now somewhat 
smaller than it used to be in the beginning, 
but the share of the locality’s own taxes 
has increased, which is a good sign for lo-
cal fiscal autonomy. However, the driving 
force behind this process is the local busi-
ness tax, whose share increased by five 
percentage points and which, in its pres-
ent form, is not considered as a suitable 
local tax.
It is important to distinguish between 
the locality’s own taxes, which are under 
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Table 2
Revenue from the locality’s own sources and other revenue types, Mio. EUR, 2016
Local govern-
ments and 
districts Mio. €
 % Among: dis-
tricts (rayon) 
Mio. €
%
A. Revenue from the locality’s own sources 131,327 55.3 4,282 6.0
1. Own taxes (right to receive the revenue, partially 
also the right to set the tax rate and to administrate)
63,702 26.8 –31 –0.0
1.1. Property tax
including: Property tax B
12,201
11,808
 5.1
5.0
1.2. Local business tax (net)1) 38,246 16.1
1.3. “Small” local taxes and revenues similar 
to tax
1,447 0.6
2. Tax shares (Shared taxes) from the local revenue 33,432 14.1
Income tax share 33,432 14.1
3. Revenue on the basis of the benefit principle (fees 
and charges)
34,193 14.4 4,313 6.0
3.1. Fees 18,489  7.8 3,561 5.9
3.2. Contributions 1,526  0.6 2  0.0
3.3. Revenue from market transactions
among: from concessions
8,898
3,212
3.8
1.6
579 0.8
3.4. Sales revenue (Fixed assets) 5,280  2.2 171  0.2
B. Intergovernmental revenue (allocations) (for 
the local level as such “from other levels”)
108,311 45.6 64,044 89.2
1. “Grants” out of the value-added tax 4,393  1.9 –
2. Grants (contributions) in the administrative 
budget2)
88,570 40.7 62,8674) 87.5
3. Grants in the asset budget3) 7,047  3.1 1,1774)  1.6
C. Net borrowing (- = net repayment) 1,342  0.6 –1,470 – 2.0
D. Other revenues (calculated as difference) –3,703 –1.6 4,953 6.9
Total revenue5) 237,277 100.0 71,8094) 100.0
Note:
1) After deduction of the business tax contribution.
2) Current transfers / payments from local governments/districts.
3) Grants and contributions for investment /. payments from local governments/districts.
4) Includes payments from local governments/districts (contains the contributions in the adminis-
trative budget, including the district contribution).
5) Without “special financing transactions” plus net borrowing resp. net repayment.
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 14: Finanzen und Steuern, Reihe 3.3: Rechnungsergeb-
nisse der Kernhaushalte der Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände, Tables 1.4 and 1.10, 2016, published 
2018. – Without city-states. – Data on districts adjusted by M. Wohltmann.
Table 3 
Dynamics of the revenue from the locality’s own sources 
1996 2003 2013 2016
Revenue from the locality’s own sources 59.8% 61.4% 53.2% 55.3%
including: own taxes 20.8% 22.8% 22.5% 26.8%
including: local business tax 11.5% 10.7% 16.5% 16.1%
Source: Compiled from [1] and its previous editions. 
the jurisdiction of the local government, 
and tax shares. In international research 
literature there is often some confusion 
surrounding what kind of tax sharing is 
being discussed. If tax sharing occurs in 
the form of tax revenue sharing, it is of 
much less value for local fiscal autonomy 
than tax base sharing (see examples of 
both cases in Table 2). The German income 
tax share is based on the local part of the 
income tax revenue. It is then transferred 
to the respective local government and 
thus can be described as a revenue from 
“own sources”. Table 2 includes the data 
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on “grants” out of the value-added tax, 
which is the money from the national VAT 
revenue, from which local governments 
receive a certain percentage through the 
application of certain indicators. This 
transfer occurs without any relation to the 
local revenue of the VAT, which would be 
very difficult to calculate.
Up to this point, we have considered 
local taxes as a single group (see also Eh-
rlicher [9]), but in the following parts of 
this paper we are going to look at each 
of them separately in the historical con-
text (see Table 4). Their history is well de-
scribed by Heller [10]. 
3. The dominance of the local business 
tax until 1969
The historical perspective of local tax-
es in Germany is shown by Table 4. In this 
article, we shall assume that the history of 
local taxation started in Germany in 1955, 
after the Federal Republic of Germany 
was formed in 1949. The 1949 Constitution 
contained explicit provisions for organiza-
tion of local governments, their functions 
and revenues, although it should be noted 
that local governments were considered 
parts of the states and the Constitution did 
not specify the three levels of government. 
Functions of local governments were de-
scribed in a general way (Article 28), but 
a more detailed description was provided 
for the taxation sphere (Article 106). Over 
time, the provisions for individual local 
taxes were further specified in the consti-
tution.
For Table 4 we chose time intervals 
which, apart from covering the same time 
span, show the dynamics of local taxa-
tion in Germany. In 1959, the income tax 
share did not exist yet, and neither did the 
above-mentioned “grants” from the VAT. 
Therefore, in that period the business tax 
dominated the local tax system. Let us 
look at this tax more closely.
The history of the business tax in Ger-
many is quite long [11] (see Hansmeyr [12] 
for the general description of this tax; for 
more information about the early tax re-
form see the Report on the Reform of the 
Municipal Taxes in the Federal Republic 
of Germany1). It was introduced as a cen-
tral government tax in Prussia in 1810, 
the same year when commercial freedom 
was declared and business and crafts were 
freed from the heavy regulations, some of 
which went as far back as to the Middle 
1 Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim Bundesmi-
nisterium der Finanzen, 1982, Gutachten zur Re-
form der Gemeindesteuern in der Bundesrepub-
lik Deutschland, Berlin. 153 p.
Table 4
Dynamics of local taxation in Germany*, Mio. EUR
1955 % 1975 % 1995 % 2015 %
Local business tax (from 1975 
net of transfer)
1,906 66.9 7,162 42.0 17,251 35.5 38,331 43.5
among: profit/capital 1,682 59.1 5,629 33.0 17,251 35.5 38,331 43.5
among: payroll 224 7.8 1,533 9.0
Income tax share 7,100 41.7 23,541 48.5 35,112 40.0
Property tax 704 24.7 2,122 12.4 7,027 19.4 13,215 15.0
among: agricultural 171 6.0 207 1.2 314 0.6 394 0.4
among: non-agricultural 533 18.7 1,915 11.2 6,713 18.8 12,821 14.6
Real estate transfer tax 
(-surcharge)
58 8.0 428 2.5 151 0.3
Other local taxes 177 62 224 1.3 578 1.2 1,439 1.6
Local taxes total 2,845 100.0 17,036 100.0 48,548 100.0 88,097 100.0
% GDP 3.1 3.1 2.6 2.9
All German taxes 21,636 123,767 416,337 673,251
VAT-transfer (“grants”) 4,690
* Cash tax revenues.
Source: The author’s calculations based on the data provided by the Federal Ministry of Finance, 
Finanzbericht 2017, p. 301–327. Until 2000: DM converted into Euro by Federal Ministry of Finance. The 
figures also contain the local taxes of the city-states.
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Ages. Before that, various German states 
had had smaller charges on business and 
crafts. When in 1891-1893 a major tax re-
form was started – the so-called Miquel 
tax reform – the revenue was assigned to 
the local level, but the reform of 1920 al-
lowed individual states to decide whether 
to include the revenue in their own bud-
gets or leave it to local governments. The 
business tax itself was introduced by the 
reform of 1936, which also specifically 
clarified that this was a local tax, that is, it 
was collected by local authorities without 
any interference of the state government. 
The law of 1936 established the three el-
ements of this tax: the tax on profit, the 
tax on capital and the payroll tax, the lat-
ter being left to the discretion of the state 
government. It should be noted that since 
the first of these laws were passed in 1810, 
the tax has not applied to the so-called free 
professions, such as medical doctors.
In this form the local business tax was 
a well-designed tax. Together with the 
property tax it basically covered the three 
factors of production: labor, capital and 
land, plus profit as the outcome of mana-
gerial capacity. Since then, the quality of 
the tax has been deteriorating as it has been 
affected by business lobbies aiming to re-
duce or abolish it. It is enough to look at 
the British experience to understand that 
this would be a short-sighted measure: in 
1982, the author of this article took part 
in a conference, which was held in Lon-
don between the chambers of commerce 
of Germany and the UK on the subject of 
business taxation. When English partners 
heard of the German local business tax, 
they sighed: “This is what we need to have 
our local governments interested in our 
needs!” Business and especially industry 
means noise, more traffic and so on and 
easily loses against the needs of quiet new 
neighborhoods.
Like in other countries, in Germany 
there is a problem of taxing businesses 
with multiple regional activities: for this 
end, there is a special law regulating this 
sphere (Zerlegungsgesetz, law of tax seg-
mentation). According to this law, the 
tax amount is apportioned to respective 
locations in proportion to the salaries and 
wages paid. This indicator is easy to cal-
culate, although the success of a specific 
business and the amount of tax it has to 
pay does not depend only on the work-
force. By the way, this special law is in 
itself not a tax law, but a law regulating 
only certain aspects of tax administration.
As was indicated above, the effect of 
the well-designed business tax was dimin-
ished by several “reforms”. As it can be 
seen from Table 4, the payroll tax disap-
peared. In order to introduce it, local gov-
ernments needed the permission of the 
state. As a result, it was not levied in all 
parts of the country. Maybe this made it 
easier to abolish it altogether in 1979. This 
tax had an advantage of providing tax 
revenues from business, even if the enter-
prises did not make profit for some time 
due to the phase of the business cycle or 
for structural reasons. This, however, also 
meant that in difficult times the payroll 
tax produced a specific additional burden, 
whereas the profit part of the tax was irrel-
evant for business in difficult times. Thus, 
the business lobby in this case was suc-
cessful, and the abolishment of the payroll 
tax was the first step that made the busi-
ness tax less effective. 
The next step was the abolishment 
of the capital part of this tax in 1997. Al-
though this part meant an extra burden 
on businesses in difficult times and thus 
caused complaints, it had been a useful 
part of the tax for local governments, be-
cause this tax base changes only slowly 
and it helps them to plan their budgets. 
As a compensation, local governments 
received a certain percentage of the na-
tional VAT revenue, which means that 
the revenue was not generated locally (it 
is practically impossible for the VAT), but 
was distributed according to some indica-
tors of local economic activity. Together 
with the abolishment of the payroll tax, 
the abolishment of the capital part of the 
business was explained by the fact that all 
taxes which are not tied to profits are bad 
for business, because they can create ex-
cessive burden when businesses are strug-
gling and there are no profits in sight. 
However, a more feasible solution would 
be to look at the complete tax system, 
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eliminate all nonprofit elements in other 
places, but keep them in the local business 
tax because of the advantages they pro-
duce there. Thus, the local business tax is 
levied on profits2 only and its impact can 
be seen in the development of cities with 
one large industry. A table in the book 
“Kommunalfinanzen” shows the business 
tax revenue of the city of Rüsselsheim, 
which largely depends on the business tax 
from Opel car manufacturing3. Changes 
of more than two thirds of the usual tax 
revenue within one or two years make it 
extremely difficult for the city manager to 
plan their budget.
Table 4 shows the dominance of the 
business tax in local budgets in 1955. More 
than two thirds of the total local revenue 
(including the tax revenue) came from the 
business tax, including the payroll tax. 
This made local authorities particularly in-
terested in developing business and more 
prone to allotting land to businesses rath-
er than using it for residential purposes. In 
the years of reconstruction, which laid the 
foundation for further economic growth, 
it was probably a feasible solution. How-
ever, with time the need to retain qualified 
workforce became more urgent for busi-
nesses, and it became more important to 
provide amenities for upper-level person-
nel. An early study on regional prefer-
ences of the population [13] showed that 
the upward-striving families wanted to 
live on the border of an agglomeration 
and have access to good infrastructure for 
families, which meant that in 1969 the lo-
cal government’s attention shifted from 
“only business” to include the interests of 
private households as well4.
2 The calculation of profit as the tax base 
is rather complicated. The typical profit as the 
result of bookkeeping is adjust-ed by various 
inclusions and deductions, for instance, to main-
tain financing neutrality between equity finan-
cing and debt financing.
3 Zimmermann/Döring 2019 [1], chapter 4, 
figure 4.3.
4 The decisive influence came from the gov-
ernment report (Troeger-Kommission (Kom-
mission für die Finanzreform), 1966, Gutachten 
über die Finanzreform in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Stuttgart. 275 p.).
4. The decisive reform of 1969: 
introducing the income tax share
Before 1969, there had been no local 
tax on personal or local income generation, 
only small taxes on consumption. Further-
more, the German system of local taxes 
followed the “one tax, one budget” prin-
ciple. This principle became particularly 
evident for the author of this article, when 
he started his work in Russia in 2000 on 
the subject of intergovernmental relations. 
It was in the volume of the first World 
Bank mission of 1992 [14] that he had in-
fluenced the change from 100% of this rule 
to the introduction of a major element of 
tax sharing within the income tax, keep-
ing in mind the experience of 1969 and the 
debates of that period. Sharing a major tax 
between different levels of government, 
in the case of Germany between all levels, 
alleviates the burden of a major reduction 
in tax revenue by distributing this loss 
among the levels. At the same time the 
tax law applies equally across the country 
(unlike the USA), which makes it easier for 
businesses to diversify into other states or 
communities. The problem is that only the 
central government is usually authorized 
to change the tax rate. It is true that the 
reform of 1969 provided the government 
with an opportunity to introduce a local 
tax rate variation by adopting a simple 
federal law, without having to amend the 
constitution again. The government, how-
ever, did not use this opportunity for rea-
sons of political economy and the situation 
has not changed since then. The fiscally 
weaker German states are afraid that this 
could lead to a race to the bottom for these 
local tax rates. Germany is a country long-
ing for unified rules and is therefore op-
posed to regional competition in any field.
Local governments were to receive 
much more revenue – more than the verti-
cal distribution of functions would justify – 
through the income tax share. Therefore, 
local governments had to hand a part of 
their business tax revenue to the state and 
federal government. Table 1 thus shows 
only the net amount left after deducting 
the contribution to the upper levels. 
The introduction of the income tax 
share was good for local finances and 
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decision-making, but it has a flaw of not 
giving local governments (and state gov-
ernments, too) the right to set their own 
tax rates (see Table 4 for the results of the 
reform). In 1975, the share of the busi-
ness tax was reduced from 67% in 1955 
to 42% in 1975, and the new income tax 
share also contributed 42%. At that point, 
the above-mentioned balance of interests 
between business and private households 
was perfect, which meant that in agglom-
eration areas, central cities went on profit-
ing from the business tax but at the same 
time suburban communities received their 
share of the income tax from their inhab-
itants. Thus, the conflict of interests had 
been reduced considerably. In comparison 
with Russia, it should be noted that the in-
come tax revenue is transferred directly to 
the home town of the taxpayer and is not 
distributed by place of work. This is irre-
spective of whether he or she earns money 
outside or inside the agglomeration cen-
ter. At least, this was the case when the au-
thor worked in Russia and then in Ukraine 
from 2000 to 2016, when this was a major 
issue in these countries. Central cities, of 
course, wanted to keep their income tax 
revenues from commuters, because it had 
been earned there and had been paid to 
the treasury at the place of work as it usu-
ally happens, also in Germany. Statistical 
reasons referring to the difficulty of split-
ting this revenue were not very convinc-
ing and may have been overcome in the 
meantime.
Compared to other existing or possi-
ble local taxes, the income tax has a num-
ber of advantages when seen from the eco-
nomic perspective. As a very broad tax, it 
carries very little excess burden, because 
if one wanted to evade it, it would mean 
giving up one’s income, which people 
usually avoid doing. Moreover, the tax 
rules are the same all over the country, 
which makes it easier for people to move 
between communities. Last not least, the 
costs of tax administration and taxpayer 
are very low, because the tax is levied as 
the national tax anyway. 
The tax then only needs to be split be-
tween the levels and on each level between 
individual entities, which requires some 
specific decisions. Similar to the case of the 
local business tax, the tax amount has to 
be assigned separately to individual com-
mercial entities, if a business has several 
locations. For Germany this is done by the 
above-mentioned law Zerlegungsgesetz. 
The national amount of the income tax rev-
enue goes to the federal and state govern-
ments at 42.5% each, and this occurs by re-
gional origin. Therefore, the states remain 
interested in improving “their” tax base. 
The local governments are guaranteed the 
remaining 15% of the sum inside the state. 
The amount should be allocated basically 
by regional origin to each community. 
However, a cap is introduced, because 
otherwise, as a colleague of mine said 
smilingly, one tennis player would finance 
a whole small community, by which he 
meant Boris Becker. Therefore, the amount 
to which a taxpayer’s 15%-share should go 
to the local budget is capped, that is, their 
tax is included as if they earned only the 
reduced amount. This procedure does not 
use up the money in the total amount for 
local governments inside a state but be-
cause this left-over money belongs to lo-
cal governments, it is used to fill up this 
amount again. The system is even more 
complicated than this (see [1; 2] for more 
detail). The system is quite complicated, 
but we believe that it makes the right em-
phasis on regional origin.
As it was mentioned before, the re-
form of 1969 permitted to introduce the 
tax rate policy by local government with-
out amending the constitution again but 
this permission unfortunately has not 
been used until today. There is no techni-
cal reason which would forbid a local tax 
rate policy within a system of shared in-
come tax, as it was shown a long time ago 
[15], so this question still remains on the 
agenda for further reforms. 
5. A reliable source: the property tax
Looking again at Table 4, we can see 
that the system of local taxes was more 
or less adequate in 1975, as businesses 
and private households paid similar 
amounts to the local budget. However, 
the property tax accounted for a rather 
small share of this sum, compared to 
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other developed countries. In Germa-
ny, this tax is actually a real estate tax, 
whereas property taxes, such as the ones 
found in the USA, may also apply to 
property other than real estate.
The property tax is possibly the oldest 
local tax [16]: the less elaborate predeces-
sor of this tax was the so-called “window 
tax”. In the beginning, having doors and 
windows in houses served as an indica-
tor of wealth and thus their owners were 
subject to special taxes. This resulted in a 
situation when people built strange hous-
es without windows and with very small 
doors, which means that the tax burden 
was really high [17]. In Germany, Prussia 
used such tax since the above-mentioned 
Miquel reform of 1892, and the law of 1936 
introduced this tax in its present form (see 
[18] and [19]). The values were calculated 
in an almost perfectionist way. The conse-
quence was that instead of the intended 
five-year interval the next – incomplete – 
re-assessment occurred in 1964 and never 
again after that. In eastern German states 
even the assessment of 1964 was not car-
ried out. The result was that the value of 
the property underwent different changes, 
from booming central cities to poor periph-
eral towns. After several admonishments, 
the constitutional court ruled in March 
2018 that in this form the law was uncon-
stitutional and had to be remedied within 
a few years, which provoked a discussion 
as to which model should be chosen. 
Nobody wanted to return to the old 
sophisticated model. Instead, the discus-
sion concentrated on the choice between 
rather simple models, which mainly rely 
on the land surface, and their opposite – 
models with full market assessment, simi-
lar to the ones used in the USA. A good 
foundation for this reform could have 
become a well-developed model which 
was introduced for consideration at the 
Upper House of the German Parliament 
(Bundesrat) in 2016, but this project was 
not pursued further due to the upcoming 
national elections (for more detail on re-
form options see Scheffler and Roith [20]). 
The other two options of the reform 
which were considered further were to 
introduce an extremely simple tax on land 
area only, without value indication, or to 
use a rather broad-based tax, but with a 
complicated element. On February 1, 2019, 
the Federal Ministry of Finance and the 
states agreed on the version that uses land 
value and for buildings the age and the av-
erage regional rent5 [23]. This model corre-
sponds to internationally recognized crite-
ria and is going to provide a foundation for 
the draft law, which is now being devel-
oped and shall hopefully be introduced. 
Therefore, February 1, 2019, shall be re-
membered as an important date in the his-
tory of German local taxation. Moreover, 
this decision has become a disappointment 
for those who were hoping for an “abolish-
ment through non-action”, as it happened 
with the national wealth tax in 1996.
However, the discussion about the re-
form may be reopened due to the possible 
regionalization of the property tax [21], 
which happened quite late in the process. 
In this case the right to issue a law would 
be transferred from the federal govern-
ment to the states, whereas the right to 
set tax rates and to receive the revenue 
would remain with local governments. It 
is likely that one state (Bavaria) will then 
choose the tax on land area without valua-
tion, whereas others will choose the more 
demanding model. This phenomenon 
would be new for the Federal Republic of 
Germany, and so far it has received mixed 
reactions from experts in this field. 
As a rule, one would prefer a nation-
wide law for such an important local tax, 
so that the right to set the tax rate would 
remain on the local level. Regionalization 
would be disastrous for the local business 
tax, because an enterprise with subsidiar-
ies in several states would be forced to 
adjust its method of calculating profit for 
each of the states. The situation is differ-
ent for the property tax. If an enterprise 
has property in various states, it would 
receive respective tax bills as before, but 
with different sums to pay, which means 
5 Federal Ministry of Finance, (2019), Bund 
und Länder verständigen sich auf Eckpunkte für 
Grundsteuer-Reform. Berlin, February 1, 2019. 
Available at: https://www.bundesfinanzmin-
isterium.de/Content/DE/Video/2019/2019-
02-01-eckpunkte-grundsteuer-reform/2019-
02-01-eckpunkte-grundsteuer-reform.html
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that there would be no need for special 
calculations.
Looking at the demand for more de-
centralization the result would be posi-
tive, though it would not be local fiscal 
economy which would be strengthened, 
but the economy of the states. Over time, 
it is likely that the better solution for the 
property tax will prevail. However, the 
varying preferences within a large state 
such as Bavaria would not be considered, 
for instance, between the rich capital and 
poorer peripheral regions.
It is also interesting to consider the tax 
effects of this new element of regionaliza-
tion. As W. Richter said in a personal con-
versation with the author of this article, “an 
investor would find it attractive to invest 
preferably in rather expensive Bavarian 
residential locations. Because of the mere 
area base of the tax there is no need to con-
sider market driven tax hikes. This is inter-
esting for profit-oriented investors. Inves-
tors also would not need to be afraid that 
local politics might ruin their calculations. 
With the concern for the neglected resi-
dential locations the tax rates would not be 
easy to raise. One would especially expect 
therefore a boom in real estate prices in 
expensive Bavarian residential locations”. 
Comparable good locations in states with 
a value-based property tax would thus lose 
some part of their attractiveness.
The currently existing system consists 
of two parts (see Table 3): agricultural and 
non-agricultural. The first part deals with 
agricultural property as it is very impor-
tant for agriculturally dominated local 
governments. It is also permitted to tax this 
property much lower in order to subsidize 
agriculture. The second part is called non-
agricultural because it deals with property 
of private households, businesses and so 
on. The forthcoming reform is expected to 
overcome this distinction between agricul-
tural and non-agricultural property. 
The question as to whether public 
property, property of churches and so 
on should be included is still open, but 
we are not going to discuss it here. The 
argument that in the case of public prop-
erty the money would go from one pub-
lic budget to another public budget does 
not make much sense since these budgets 
belong to different levels of government. 
If we look at the case of Marburg, a city 
with a large university, the question aris-
es as to why the local government should 
provide property without any remunera-
tion, if the scarce land could be used to 
attract tax paying units. In addressing 
this issue, Germany can benefit from the 
experience of other countries, for exam-
ple, Canada, where payments in lieu of 
taxes perform the function of transfers 
between the levels.
Table 4 shows that after 1955 the prop-
erty tax contributed a share of somewhat 
below 20% to the local tax revenue, which 
is not much compared with other countries 
and, taking into consideration its strengths 
as a local tax, might well be higher. 
6. Fiddling with small taxes
All local governments across the 
world are always tempted to levy addi-
tional small taxes for this and that pur-
pose, hoping to reap additional revenue. 
Some of the taxes may be useful, like dog 
taxes, which prevent people from keep-
ing too many dogs. In Germany, a few 
years ago, several states introduced a tax 
on second homes. Such tax may be useful 
in resort communities, where people buy 
second homes and then leave them empty 
for most of the year, which does not look 
good and results in land scarcity. Many 
cities now also levy a city tax for hotel 
stays, which is basically a kind of tourist 
entry fee. Recently in Hessia some com-
munities have introduced horse taxes on 
leisure horses, arguing that this way high-
income persons could contribute more to 
the prosperity of the place. 
Many such small local taxes are actu-
ally “nuisance taxes” [14, p. 183], that is, 
they yield an insignificant revenue while 
being at the same time burdensome for 
taxpayers and authorities, in a word, are 
counterproductive. Table 5 shows taxes 
of this type in Germany. According to 
the data in Table 3, they account together 
for less than 2% of the local tax revenue. 
These taxes are introduced by passing 
a law on the local level, whereas all the 
other taxes discussed above are based on 
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federal laws, although they do provide lo-
cal governments with a source of revenue. 
Table 5
“Small” local taxes, Mio EUR, 2016
“Small” local taxes 1,391.3 96.2%
Entertainment tax 898.9 22.0%
Dog license fee 318.4 22.0%
Second home tax 129.3 8.9%
Hunting- and fishing tax 9.6 0.7%
Other taxes 35.1 2.4%
Tax-like levies1) 55.5 3.8%
Casino levy 22.5 1.6%
Tourism duty 21.6 1.5%
Other levies 11.4 0.8%
Total revenue 1,446.8 100.0%
For information only: 
Concessionary duty 
(as a part of the market 
transactions revenue) 
Utilities 3,180.5
including: electricity 
supply
1,978.5
Traffic companies 5.2
Economy and tourism 26.1
Concessionary duty total 3,211.8
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 14, 
Reihe 3.3, Rechnungsergebnisse der Kernhaushalte 
der Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände 2016, Wi-
esbaden 2018, Table 1.10. – Concessionary duty: 
direct information from Statistisches Bundesamt.
An additional revenue source, which 
possibly does not exist in many countries, 
are concessionary payments from, for in-
stance, electricity producing companies 
to local governments for the permission 
to have their power lines go through the 
local government area. The revenue from 
these concessionary payments is more 
than three times the amount of the rev-
enue obtained from all small local taxes. 
7. Looking ahead: necessary reforms
Looking at the development of local 
taxation in Germany since 1949, one can 
conclude that initially it developed in the 
right direction, as it is illustrated by the 
data for 1975 in Table 3. In 1975, busi-
nesses and private households were taxed 
equally; the property tax was in place and 
unchallenged by the court; and the strange 
“share” of the VAT had not yet been intro-
duced. We believe that this is the optimal 
structure that the German taxation system 
should go back to. 
The hardest task in this respect is to 
deal with the local business tax as the nec-
essary reform had time and again been 
impeded by the objections of businesses. 
On the other hand, even if the reform is 
not introduced, it is still better for the 
country to live with this “bad” form of a 
local business tax than without it, as the 
case of Great Britain had shown. 
As for the income tax share, it appears 
fine in its setup, although, since 1969, local 
governments has been lacking the author-
ity to set tax rates. 
A reform of the property tax is under 
way, and hopefully it will move in the 
right direction. In general, the German 
local tax system is quite productive and, 
with some improvements, holds signifi-
cant potential for further development
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